Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External (SEP)

One-Sentence Thesis

The debate between internalism and externalism about reasons concerns whether an agent's reasons for action must be grounded in the agent's existing motivational states (internalism) or can be grounded in facts about value or rational requirements that are independent of those states (externalism). The article surveys the main positions: Humean internalism (reasons must connect to desires via means-end reasoning), Kantian/Korsgaardian externalism (reasons derive from the requirements of practical reason itself), and intermediate positions.

Argument Outline

1. 1Introduction to the internalism vs. externalism debate in the context of reasons for action
2. 2Presentation of the internalist view, which holds that reasons for action must be connected to an agent's motivations or desires
3. 3Critique of internalism and presentation of the externalist view, which holds that reasons for action can exist independently of an agent's motivations or desires
4. 4Discussion of the implications of each view for our understanding of normative reasons and their role in guiding action
5. 5Examination of the relationship between internal and external reasons and the concept of rationality
6. 6Consideration of potential challenges and objections to both internalist and externalist views
7. 7Evaluation of the significance of the internal vs. external distinction for broader debates in metaethics and moral philosophy

Key Distinctions

Key Terms